

8140 ee 27

A
LETTER
FROM A
Member of the last Parliament,
TO A
New Member of the present, &c.

(Price One Shilling.)



Л Е Т Т Е Й

А М Я Т

Сборник рассказов о жизни Михаила Бакунинского

А О Т

(Сборник рассказов о жизни Михаила Бакунинского)

6
A

LETTER

FROM A

Member of the last Parliament,

TO A

NEW MEMBER of the Present,

CONCERNING

The Conduct of the War with SPAIN:

WITH

Some OBSERVATIONS on the HANOVER
NEUTRALITY, as far as it may relate to,
or affect Great Britain.

The SECOND EDITION.



LONDON:

Printed for T. COOPER, at the *Globe*, in *Peter-noster Row.* M.DCC.XLII.

LETTER



New MEMBER of the Library

A. O. T.

New MEMBER of the Library

CONCERNING

The Coming of the War with SPAIN

WITH

Some Observations on the WAR
MISERABILITY as far as it may affect
the High Cost of Living

The Second Edition



London:

Printed for T. Cooke in Pall-Mall
by W. D. & H. Foulis.

edit yd as llw as jdej Dlann Dfwr 20
cillongo erewr bnd ywllt ywllt
clos35w naf. **A** Mwllt ywllt

LETTER

FROM A

Member of the last Parliament,

TO A

NEW MEMBER of the present, &c.

SIR,

THE Conduct of the present Administration, during a Course of twenty Years, as to their Pacifick Transactions and Negotiations, has been from Time to Time sufficiently explained in former Writings, the necessary Consequences of it then foretold, and now fatally verified by the present Situation, or rather Subversion, of the Balance of Power in *Europe*, by our Distresses at home, and by the Contempt we are sunk into abroad.

The Want of OEcconomy at home, and of
a due Regard for publick Credit during the
same Number of Years, is likewise equally
known, and felt, by the undiminished Bur-

B

den of our National Debt, as well as by the more numerous Taxes, and more oppressive Methods of collecting them, than we even groan'd under during the last long, and glorious War. Immense Sums have been expended abroad, to bring the House of *Austria*, and all *Europe*, into the present unfortunate Situation, in Pursuance of that Maxim so necessary for the private Support and Favour of the Minister, and so agreeable to the Princes of *Germany*, that the Reduction of the House of *Austria* in the Empire was a necessary Step to the aggrandizing the other Members of it. The Profusion has been equal at home, and as fatal in it's Effects; the more Money was raised, the more Employments became numerous and lucrative, and strengthned the Hands of an Administration, which could only subsist by Prostitution and Corruption.

All these Points have been already so fully explain'd in Print, that it would be unnecessary now to say any more upon them, taking it for granted that you are fully informed of them ; nor shall I trouble you with entering into any new Examination of the scandalous and iniquitous Convention with *Spain*; what has been already publish'd upon that Head, together with the Refusal of the Administration, to submit it to the Consideration and Examination of the last Parliament, are sufficient Reasons for laying it before the present,

fent, at a proper Time; but as the extraordinary Conduct of the present War more immediately requires our Attention, I propose giving you freely and impartially my thoughts upon it. Here we view the Administration in a new Light; we have seen how they have improv'd the Blessings, and cultivated the Arts of Peace; we shall now behold them carrying on a War with the same Abilities, the same Advantage to the Publick, so that it will be difficult to decide in which Province they have excelled.

The Parliament last Year thought an Enquiry into this Affair necessary; and it is become more absolutely so, by the Conduct and Success of this Year. They then called for Papers in both Houses; which, though defective, were laid before them in pursuance of the Sense of that Majority in both, so remarkable in Parliaments of late for Enquiries into the Conduct of the Minister Paymaster-General. But, defective as those Papers were, they will, nevertheless, afford some Lights, and many Observations, which, perhaps, were not foreseen by those that were for communicating so little. It appears sufficiently by several Letters, from the Admirals and others, that there were just Reasons for great Complaints, and that there were some Abuses in the inferior and lower Part of the Administration of the Navy at least: But to enter

into that low Detail at present, would be to divert us from the necessary and great Object that requires all our Attention, to a Littleness that falls of Course with the rest. The only Observation worth making on them is, that it was impossible to expect it should have been much better under a Money-giving Administration, to all whom it employs for electing, or being elected; and indeed there must be some Grains of Allowance, when it is become a necessary Qualification for being a Commissioner of the Navy or Victualling, or for having any material Concern in the Ordnance, to be a Member of Parliament; for it is really hard, out of 4 or 500 a Year, to pay for a new Election once in seven Years, Coach-hire to *Tower-Hill, Westminster*, and for other Attendances: Such Salaries, attended with such Expences, could never raise considerable Fortunes.

It appears by the Papers laid before both Houses, that *Haddock* was, the 10th of April 1738, ordered to sail to the *Mediterranean*; but it is a Pity the Instructions then given him were not produced, and that it should be thought material and necessary to acquaint the Parliament with nothing more than when he was first ordered to sail; especially since, if they had been produced, they must have been highly for the Honour of the Minister, who

who had asserted in that very Parliament, that it was that Fleet, and those Orders, which forced *Spain* to condescend to sign the boasted glorious Convention. What might have appeared from these Instructions, as they have not been produced, I shall not now pretend to guess at ; but from the sailing Orders now produced, it appears, that the Recalling of that Fleet was mutually understood to be the Condition and Consequence of signing that Convention. I mean not indeed the sailing Orders produced to the House of Commons, for they might have made some Use of such Facts, but those delivered to the House of Lords ; for of 16 sailing Orders from the Admiralty to *Haddock* which were laid before that House, but two of them were communicated to the House of Commons. This shews what Treatment our late Parliaments have met with, even when a Minister has refused an effectual Enquiry, and for the Appearance only proposes an ineffectual and useless one himself ; and yet, even in that, they must not be trusted, nor the same Facts suffered to appear in the two Houses, that were to be amused with the very same sham Enquiry.

I shall take Notice of two very remarkable Orders laid before the Lords only : The first is, the Lords of the Admiralty to *Haddock*, dated the 29 January 1738,

“ You

" You are hereby required and directed forth-
" with to repair to *England*." The Con-
vention, I must observe, was ratified here the
24th. Thus the Quickness of doing it, and
the Thing done, shews the Sense of doing it,
in respect to both Nations. The Shame of
recalling our Fleet before any of our Rights
were finally settled, was urged as an Argu-
ment against the Convention, and that it was
only a designed Amusement for gaining Time
by pretended subsequent Negotiations. It was
at first denied, that the Fleet was recalled;
but as the Scandal of it, and the Condition
upon which alone it was done, was urged in
every Debate against the Convention, it was
at last given out and asserted, that Orders
were sent to countermand the former Orders.
Notwithstanding which, it appears by another
Order before the Lords, from the Admiralty
to *Haddock*, the 10 March 1738, " You are
" hereby directed and required (notwith-
" standing any former Orders) to remain
" with your Squadron at *Gibraltar*." The
Date is extremely remarkable, for the Lords
had, some time before, the Convention under
Consideration; and their Address was so
worded, as to carry a seeming Approbation
of that Convention, by expressing their Reliance
on his Majesty's obtaining, in Pursuance
of it, by the Plenipotentiaries, the Acknowl-
ledgment of our Rights. The Commons, on
the

the 8th and 9th of *March*, followed the same Method of screening the Convention, with an Appearance to some of approving it, by expressing their Dependance that his Majesty would obtain those Rights for us by the Plenipotentiaries that were pretended to be obtained by the Convention. But can there be a stronger Proof of the Iniquity of the Convention, or of a Parliamentary Condemnation of it, than the Orders sent the very next Day, and not before, for the Fleet to remain at *Gibraltar*? It is a Confession that the Convention did not acknowledge our Rights, and that there were no Hopes of obtaining the Enjoyment or Acknowledgment of them from the Conferences that were to be held by the Plenipotentiaries of both Nations, for finally settling and determining that Dispute. From these Resolutions of Parliament our Minister saw and acknowledged, the Consequence of them would be a Rupture with *Spain*; and his asking and obtaining a Vote of Credit for the Encrease of our Forces, in consequence of which those Seamen who were so lately discharged, were now again wanting, is a farther Proof of his Sentiments. As this proves the Sense of our Minister in recalling and countermanding the Fleet, so the Declarations of *Spain* to our Minister, as soon as they heard of the countermanding Orders, and afterwards more fully to our Plenipotentiaries,

faries, and their constantly affixing the Continuance of the Fleet at *Gibraltar* as the Reason for not paying the 95000*l.* stipulated, shews their Sense of the Matter; and that the Reasons first for recalling our Fleet, and afterwards for countering it, was understood and taken in the same Sense by the Ministers of both Nations, as the Condition of our future Friendship or Enmity. I cannot help making one Remark upon the whole of our Minister's late Proceedings with *Spain*, that the *Spaniards* have published to the whole World, by way of Appeal, the Transactions that passed between him and them, with their Remarks upon these Transactions, yet he has never attempted to answer and appeal in like manner to the World, which must proceed from one of these two Causes; either that our Demands and Acts are not justifiable, or that the Transactions of our Minister on that Head must not see the Light, his Safety being to be preferred both to the Rights and Honour of the Nation.

But, to return to the more immediate Conduct of the War, and particularly the letting of the *Spanish* Fleet escape from *Cadiz*, since the Papers laid before the House relating to this Point are more particular than those relating to any other, as being the Action as yet of the greatest Consequence in the War, I shall only shew the Cause and state the Facts.

The first Letter or Order in this Affair was dated the 14th of February 1739, to Admiral *Haddock*, setting forth the Danger the Island of *Minorca* was threatened with from the Preparations for an Embarkation in *Catalonia*; and from the Orders given to transport 100 Pieces of Cannon to *Majorca*: He therefore was ordered to send a Force there under a proper Commander; and, if necessary, to go with his whole Fleet. In this Letter was inclosed the two Papers of Intelligence upon which the Whole was built: The first is thus; Letters from *Barcelona* the 16th of January advise, "That Orders were given there to transport 60 Pieces (the Letter has added but 40 to them to complete the 100) to *Majorca*; that they had taken up four Vessels to carry Part of them; that Orders were given for 28 Battalions to hold themselves in Readiness to embark the first Opportunity." The next Paper is without Date or Place mentioned, and is so solemn and important, that it is Pity it should not be known from what Place it came; for it says, — "It is very probable that Orders have been given to hire and take up transport Ships, since the general Officers, who are named to command the Troops designed for *Majorca*, have received Orders to repair immediately to *Barcelona*." Inclosed is a List of the said formidable Officers. This is the whole Foundation

dation of Intelligence, upon which these Orders were sent to *Haddock*, yet grounded upon these wild Orders of *Spain*, and wise Conclusions somewhere, without any Knowledge of above 4 Ships for this mighty Embarkation, or Certainty of Troops being then ready to be transported, and even though the Conclusions from the Intelligences plainly proved the Insufficiency of any Apprehensions from these *Spanish Rodomantades*, our wise Minister thought *Minorca* in the utmost Danger.

But, as there may be some who think there was Cause to apprehend some Attempts of dangerous Consequence to that Island, from another Part of the Narrative of the Orders laid before the House of Commons, from the Secretary of State, let that be considered too. It is of the 25th of *March* 1740, to Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, in the following Words :
 " An Account having been received from
 " Rear Admiral *Haddock*, that he having
 " had Advice of the Preparations making by
 " the *Spaniards* to attack *Minorca*, he was
 " proceeding to *Mahon* with Part of his
 " Squadron, leaving the rest with Sir *Chaloner*
 " *Ogle*." Thus says the Narrative : But the Copy of the Letters written by Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, afterwards called for, says, in that of the 7th of *March*, " I received, the
 " 6th, the Commands to Admiral *Haddock*,
 " dated the 14th of *February*, which I have
 " opened ; and FINDING THEREBY the
 Danger

" Danger the Island of *Minorca* is threatened
" ed with — I propose, in Obedience to his
" Majesty's Commands, SIGNIFIED ALSO
" by your Grace, forthwith to proceed to
" join Admiral *Haddock* at *Mahon*, — fear-
" ing, as Admiral *Haddock* proposed to clean
" and refit THOSE Ships with him, that he
" might be in want of Ships, in a Capacity of
" performing the Service directed." By this
it appears, that all the Intelligence was from
hence; that *Ogle* had heard nothing of that
Danger before; and to him it was plain that
Haddock had left him, and gone to *Mahon*,
only to clean and refit those Ships he took along
with him; not out of any Apprehensions of
Danger to that Island, but for that other
Cause, so directly opposite and self-evident to
him, that he went to join him, fearing he
might be in Want of Ships in a Capacity of
performing the Service directed. And surely,
it would be very surprising indeed, if *Had-
dock*, upon having bad Advice of the Prepa-
rations making by the Spaniards to attack Mi-
norca, went with such Ships only as are de-
scribed by Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, which could be
no ways fit for that Service. But if another
Question may be asked; How little and tri-
fling must be the Advice he had received,
since we see upon what ridiculous Information
and contemptible Inferences, it was thought
it might be necessary to have a Conjunction
of blood?

of the whole Fleet? Upon cooler Thoughts, when Time had evaporated our Ministerial Apprehensions of the Naval Power of *Spain*, we find they were sensible, and knew what all the World knew before: For in the Letter from the Secretary of State to Admiral *Haddock*, the 4th of *April* following, it is said, there is "nothing to be apprehended from the Naval Power of *Spain*, Monsieur *De Bene* having no more than four or five Ships at *Carthagena*." Notwithstanding that on the 14th of *February* before, it was thought it might be necessary to send our whole Fleet to defend *Minorca*, against this invincible and invisible great Naval Power of *Spain* in the *Mediterranean*.

I cannot help making one Remark more upon the Letter of Sir *Chaloner Ogle's*: For it is said, *He proposed, in Obedience to his Majesty's Commands, signified also by your Grace, forthwith to proceed, &c.* The Letter of the 14th of *February*, which this is in Answer to, does by no means admit of that Expression; since that Letter from his Grace will not bear this Coupling of them together with the Commands of his Majesty. One cannot therefore but reflect that one has known, that there has been ostensible and non-ostensible Orders, ostensible and non-ostensible Correspondence of publick Transactions; and one may conceive what may happen, in case the Letters should

should be delivered to a Person with whom the secret Correspondence was not originally settled. It must be certain, at least, that Sir Chaloner Ogle did nothing wrong in this whole Affair, since he is sent so far off with so great a Command and Trust, which was hoped would make us amends for letting out the Spanish Fleet from Cadiz, in consequence of his Execution of the Orders before mentioned.

It is not surprising that this whole Intelligence of the Danger of the Island of Minorca, should have been transmitted from hence, accompanied with Orders, in consequence of it, to Sir Chaloner Ogle ; and that he who was so much nigher, and acting in that high Station of Admiral, should never have heard, or so much as dream'd of it before, as appears by the whole tenor of his Letter, and his Actions in consequence of his Orders thereupon ? This was the only Point, the Ministers would last Year suffer to be more fully laid before the House, than any other Part of their Conduct, as they thought what was communicated would most tend to justify their Actions, in what otherwise was highly blameable ; and yet they were so very deficient as not to produce that Letter from Admiral Haddock, mentioned in the Letter of the 25th of March, of his having bad Advice of the Preparations making by the Spaniards to attack Minorca,

Minorca, he was proceeding to Mahon; a Thing so necessary for their Defence, though so contradictory to what is the Substance of Sir Chaloner Ogle's Letter, that there can be but one Cause assign'd for it's not having been produced. Nor must it be forgot here, the Distance of Time between the 14th of *February* and the 25th of *March*, when this last Letter was writ; since it admits so much Time for better digesting this tremendous Piece of Intelligence from *Spain*: And it seems extremely odd, that this Letter of the 25th of *March* should be directed to Sir Chaloner Ogle, who was thereby supposed to be at *Gibraltar*, to signify his Majesty's Pleasure that he should immediately go with the Squadron under his Command, and lye off Cadiz, &c. I say, it is extremely odd, if they thought at all about the Orders they had before given, that they could not conceive, that their Orders of the 14th of *February* must long before have been delivered to Sir Chaloner Ogle; and that they should not apprehend, that the Force of them should require That Obedience which was paid to them; this I will, by no means, at present attribute to the After-Thoughts and Digestion of what they knew they had ordered, when their dreadful Apprehensions for *Minorca* were strong upon them; and that therefore they designed it to exonerate themselves from the Blame and Consequences

quences that might follow from their former ill-grounded and chimerical Apprehensions; for it is not clear enough done for that, nor must we suppose it impossible for our Ministers to transact or order any national Affair without blundering. I shall therefore attribute it to that Cause, which, as it was the Principle of the long peaceable Part of the Administration, is become a Habit and Custom, without which they can form no Ideas of foreign Affairs or Wars: What I mean is, their always acting the Bully, when they thought they might safely do it, at only the Expence of the Nation's Treasure; and at all other Times frightened at their own Shadows, and at Bugbears of their own making; which will appear plainly to have operated through their whole Conduct of this War.

The Consequence of these Orders were the letting out of the *Cadiz* Squadron; which gave still more dreadful Apprehensions of Dangers to our timid Ministers.—*Vernon*, and the *West-Indies*, was the least Sacrifice that they thought could be made to it: Even this Island, it was thought, might be in as much Danger of being devoured by this small stole-away Squadron, as it was from their invincible *Armado* in the Times of *Elizabeth*. The several Orders given to our Admirals upon this, are full of that Perplexity, full of that Fear, whichsoever was

was alternately most prevalent. This will appear by the several Orders given, and therefore necessary here to be mentioned; That to *Haddock*, of the 18th of *April*, shew their several Apprehensions and Suspicions of the important Consequences of letting out that Fleet ; for he is order'd to " send Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, or any other, with " Ten Ships to the *West-Indies*, if the *Span- nish* Squadron should be gone from *Cadiz* " there ; but if to *Ferrol*, or *ENGLAND*, to " follow them as fast as possible." The Orders to Admiral *Baleben*, of the 2d of *April*, were, " to go immediately with the few " Ships that were ready, and prevent the " Spanish Squadron at *Ferrol* from going " to *Cadiz*, or the *West Indies* ; — but if " they attempted to sail for *England*, to fol- " low them." Here we appear to be alarmed at another Invasion from the small Squadron then at *Ferrol* ; so much our Fears predominate in all the Orders given by our Ministers, who, at that Time, conceived no Apprehensions from the *Cadiz* Squadron ; for they did not know where it was gone, on the 18th of *April* afterwards, as appears by the Orders beforementioned, and on that very Day too, they likewise sent Orders to *Baleben*, " that if he found the *Ferrol* Squa- " dron gone to the *West Indies*, and no Em- " barkations making for *England*, then to " return

" return home." How far this Possession of Fear operated, even to the dreading of an Embarkation from *Ferrol*, after the Supposition of the Squadron there being gone to the *West-Indies*, is too much Matter of Ridicule to admit of serious Observations on it. But is it not surprising, if any thing can be so in that State of Mind in which these Orders were given, that *Balchen* should not have been acquainted, and Orders given him in pursuance of it, to act according to those they gave the very same Day to *Haddock*, upon their knowing the *Cadiz* Squadron was fail'd, and their Apprehensions of it's being gone to *Ferrol* or *England*, in which case *Ogle* was to follow them as fast as possible? The Orders being directed to *Haddock*, and the Contents shew, they knew or supposed, that our whole combined Fleet in the *Mediterranean* was then at *Minorca*, or thereabouts. What Effects of Fear! to expect this Service to be performed by Persons at such a Distance, and yet the very same Day to send Orders to another Admiral, more properly stationed, who alone could prevent, or do any immediate Service in both those Cases, without acquainting him of it, and giving him Orders in pursuance of those Apprehensions, which thus recalled a great Part of our Fleet.

Having thus shewn the Cause and Effect of letting out the *Cadiz* Squadron as to our
 -
 D Fears
 horfield

Fears at home, it is necessary to consider it in the same Light in regard to *Vernon* and the *West-Indies*. Ten Ships have been already mentioned to have been order'd from *Haddock* after the *Spaniards*, if they were gone there; and on the 24th of *April*, Orders were given here, "to fit out with the ut-
"most Expedition, ten Ships of the Line,
"for the *West-Indies*." This shews the Danger that was apprehended he would be in, if any considerable Force went from *Europe* against him. But no sooner was it certainly known here, that the *Cadiz* Squadron was safe at *Ferrol*, but both *Balchen* and *Ogle* were ordered home, and all was calm, and the whole Summer employ'd in pompous Orders and magnificent Parade of our Fleet, without the Permission of going out of our own Channel, or protecting our Trade in it.

But as it may appear too ridiculous to suppose our Minister acting in War as he had always done in Times of Peace, subsisting on the Expedient of the Day, and warding only the immediate Danger and Apprehension, however fatal such a narrow View might be in it's Consequence; and according to the plainest Proof, not adhering to, or having designed or pursued any national Scheme for our Advantage; it will therefore be necessary to examine the Grounds and the Operations of this Summer, though it should be to the no small Diminution of the well-established

blished Character of our Minister, in supposing he had any regular Design to pursue, which might victoriously end the War.

We must now consider the whole *Spanish* Fleet safe at *Ferrol*, and though we might fear either Part, when separated, might by itself do us great Mischief, either in the *West-Indies*, or by invading us at home; yet having them thus both together, *Vernon* was safe; and 'twas supposed that *Norris*, with our vast and mighty Preparations, would at least defend us at home; and, perhaps, it was hoped, the Winds, the Season, the Diligence and Integrity of all employ'd, might have conspired to let this great Fleet, honoured with the Presence of one of the Royal Family, have sail'd in due Time, and have so happily placed it, if attended with no other Success, as thereby to have totally prevented either the *Spaniards* sailing from *Ferrol*, or the *French* from *Brest*, to the *West-Indies*.

It is necessary to take some Notice of the Conduct of *France* here, and what was to be expected from thence at this Time; they had been for some Time preparing to put to Sea a considerable Fleet from *Toulon* and *Brest*; the Advices of it were strong and frequent; it likewise was foreseen by Admiral *Vernon*, and our Colonies; the last of which more particularly mentions it, and enters into such a Detail, that it was easy to

foresee their Designs were for the *West-Indies*, which appears by the Letter from the Secretary of State to the Lords of the Admiralty, dated the 24th of April, 1740, with the *Barbados Petition* inclosed; in which they set forth, that the *French* were buying up great Quantities of Beef in *Martinico*, and that they were likewise buying up great Quantities of Beef for their Fleet at *Brest* in *Ireland*, and therefore desire Ships for the Protection of that Island, because of the Danger there would be, if any Fleet went against it. The Answer of their Lordships to it was founded on great Foresight and Penetration, which was that this Petition was on the Supposition of a War breaking out with *France*, which did not appear to them. In this very Month too, the Declarations of *France* to our Court, after the taking of *Porto Bello*, were so very plain and explicite, in respect to the limiting our Operations of War in the *West-Indies*; and the Tendency of their Preparations in *France* was so visible and certain, that it is with the utmost Astonishment we see the Administration so self-contented and quiet, from a thorough Persuasion, that *France* would not go to War with us on this Account; that therefore all was safe, and that their Menaces and expensive Preparations, both in *Europe* and *America*, were for nothing. It does not seem to

to have ever entered into their Heads till the *French* Fleet sailed, that it was possible for them ever to go there; though they knew the *French* had been making Preparations for it, and that it was the only Place in which they could effectually limit our Operations; and the only thing left them to do; and what our Ministers could alone suspect they wold do, since they were so entirely convinced that *France* would not enter into an immediate War with us; and yet, though they knew in *April* that the *French* were buying up Provisions in *Ireland*, they never lay'd an Embargo on them there, till the *French* Squadrons had been sailed about two Months to the *West-Indies*. also H

The Orders given at home (and nothing else was done but giving Orders) to *Norris* and *Bulchen*, and others, are nothing, as yet appears, but one continued Heap of Uncertainty and Irresolution, varying without any seeming Cause or Design; for it never seems once to have entered into their Heads, that the *French* could sail to the *West-Indies*, and that it was possible for the *Spaniards* ever to escape and sail there from *Ferrol*; all Hopes seem placed in our mighty Fleet, somehow or somewhere, that it would prevent, either the whole, or any Part of these separate Fleets sailing to the *West-Indies*. It is reckon'd the *Ferrol* Squadron sail'd the End of

of *July*, and the *French Squadron* about the 11th of *August*. When one considers that, and the Intelligence we might and must have had from *France*, of what passed there, one can scarce even now forbear laughing, to see the whole Month of *August* filled up with a parcel of Orders for embarking sometimes one Regiment, sometimes two, on board the Squadron with *Balchen*, and then again the same backwards and forwards on board the Fleet with *Norris*; till at last, on the 26th of *August*, they ordered one Regiment to *Balchen*, and on the 29th one to *Norris*; soon after which, they acknowledge to have received Advice of the sailing of both Fleets.

Strange and unaccountable as that Summer's Conduct appears, it is impossible to solve it, without being convinced that our Ministers, and all they employ in their Naval Affairs, are possessed by the same Spirit, and were firmly persuaded that *France* could not hurt us, or was capable of having any other Views than the Junction of their two Fleets which, it might be hoped, would be prevented by Sir John *Norris*, if he could sail: And yet even this cannot be supposed, by any other Set of Men, without seeing that, in such a Case, *France* was ready, and must soon break with us. Yet it is plain that this did not admit, in some material Instances, of

so much as a Supposition amongst them, no more than the Possibility of changing the Seat of War from the Seas of *Europe*, to those of *America*; and a strong and unanswerable Evidence of this Prepossession appears by their Conduct, in sending the Convoy and Transports to Admiral *Vernon*, who was acquainted by the Letter of the 4th of *July* from the Secretary of State, that the Convoy with the Transports would be one 70, and three 60 Gun Ships. The 24th of *July*, which was after the *Spaniards* were sailed from *Ferrol*, the Convoy was to be one third Rate, five fourth Rates, and one sixth Rate; and the Transports would have gone with this small Convoy, had the Winds permitted, the Troops being all embarked the 4th of *August*; which had they done, they might, in all Probability, have been destroyed by the superior Power of the Enemy.

Did not these Facts appear upon their own Papers, it would scarce be credited, that only seven Men of War should then be sent to the Assistance of Admiral *Vernon*, and for a Convoy of this Importance; and yet see, by those very Papers, that upon Suspicion of but one Part of the *Spanish* Fleet having sail'd but a few Months before to the *West-Indies*, that 20 Men of War were to be sent after them as necessary to reinforce *Vernon*. Having thus given you my Observations on the Conduct

duct of the War in Europe for the first Year; I shall now proceed to give you those on the extraordinary Conduct of it in America from the Beginning to this Time, as far as we are informed.

The first and only Orders that are produced to Admiral *Vernon*, are from the Admiralty, dated the 14th of July 1739, where in he was directed to follow such Instructions as he should receive from his Majesty's Secretary of State. What these were, does not appear; but considering the Time of giving them, and of his going out, it could be only Orders for Reprisals. For the first Orders that appear to be given him by the Secretary of State, are dated the 28th of September following; which were, *To burn the Men of War and Galleons at Cartagena and Porto Bello, and to attempt that, or any Thing of that Nature:* Which plainly prove how limited his Orders were before, and with which he sailed to the West Indies; and how very restrictive they were even now, being limited only to Things of that Nature. But even these Orders, restraining as they were, never arrived to him, till after his taking of *Porto Bello*; the very Ships that carried these Orders, it is reckoned, did not sail from hence, till the 2d of November, and War was declared the 23d of October; and yet the last Order that was thought proper to be communicated

municated to the House of all that were sent to Admiral *Vernon*, is that of the 28th of September. Whether there were any others sent him afterwards, or that he was left to himself in this Respect, as well as to Wants of Supplies, Time will discover. As this Part of the Conduct of the War has been already treated of in a short, and as yet unanswered Manner, I choose rather to quote it, than write the Substance of it in a worse Stile. It is as follows, *viz.*

“ But now let us take a View of his Conduct in this War.

“ It is apparent to the whole Nation that it ought to have been prosecuted with the utmost Vigour and Expedition in the *West-Indies*, where alone we could distress our *Enemy* in the most sensible Manner, and obtain any lasting Advantage to this Nation. Yet the timely supplying and reinforcing of Admiral *Vernon* there, notwithstanding the Knowledge of his most essential Wants, was most shamefully neglected. His Success shews what might have been done, had he been supplied with a small Number of *Land-Forces* sent over from hence even in the Spring, before our *Enemy* sent such Numbers, and had Time given them to fortify themselves, which is an irretrievable Omission, considering our numerous and useless Army kept at home

E “ last

" last Year, though Transports for 8000
" Men to the *West-Indies* were taken up in
" December 1739, some of which might
" have been employed there with such Pro-
" bability of Success, that a Blow given in
" Time might have reduced *Spain* before
" now to reasonable Terms of Accommoda-
" tion, and prevented *France* from sending
" their Squadrons to the *West-Indies*.

" But the Inactivity of our Fleets, though
" fitted out at a monstrous Expence, is a
" Sort of Proof that the *great Man* had more
" Desire to tire *us* of the War than our *Ene-*
" *mies*. His losing the Opportunity of be-
" ginning it, by an early and decisive Stroke,
" as he certainly might have done, proves
" him extremely backward; and his not
" sending Succours to Admiral *Vernon* from
" the 2d of November 1739, to the Middle
" of June 1740, which is seven Months,
" though they were under great Apprehen-
" sions of the *Spanish* Fleet being sailed thi-
" ther and superior to him, is a wonderful In-
" stance of *ill Policy*, if not something worse.
" It appears, by the Letters laid before *Par-*
" *liament*, that the *Admiral* more than once
" complain'd of being *locked up in Port*, and
" disabled from undertaking any Enterprize,
" for *Want of Provisions*, and *naval Stores*.
" Are the glorious Actions, which the *Ad-*
" *miral* has performed, to be attributed to
" the

" the Minister? —— No surely. —— They
 " seem to be almost Miracles, rather than
 " any thing else, considering the *small Force*,
 " with which he performed them. But to
 " prove, beyond all Contradiction, that by
 " Orders from hence there was no Reason to
 " expect what was done, we need only ap-
 " peal to the *Admiral's Letters*. — He makes
 " a kind of Excuse for what he had done,
 " hoping it might be understood to be *within*
 " the MEANING of his *Instructions*; which
 " plainly manifests that he had no POSITIVE
 " INSTRUCTIONS for the doing it, and it
 " appears that the *first Instructions* received
 " by him, for any Thing of the same Kind,
 " were after this Service was performed.

" That this is true, appears from the Ad-
 " miral's Letters, laid upon the Table of the
 " House of Commons the last Parliament.

" In one of them he complains of empty
 " Store-Houses; the Shrowds rotten; his
 " Ships over-masted; sent to Sea with old
 " Guard-Ship Rigging.

" In his next Letter, he complains of being
 " disabled from keeping the Sea for Want of
 " Stores, and reduced to his Neighbour Don
 " Blas's Fate, to be laid by the Walls; that
 " he is in a melancholy and forlorn State.

" In another Letter, he complains again of
 " old Rigging being sent to him; the Officers

" of the Yard thinking it only another Spit-head Expedition." *

Our Expedition, as it was called, to the *West-Indies*, was the standing Jest of every Court in *Europe*, as well as at home. To take up Transports in *December* 1739 for 8000 Men, before the Troops designed to be put on board were raised, even but just allowed to be raised, was Matter of great Ridicule then, and the Effects of it has since been fatally felt; even now at last, it is become, by Experiment only, a Self-conviction to the Ministers: For the Supply for this Year's Expedition consists of old disciplin'd Regiments; which is a Proof of their own bad Conduct before.

The general Officers employed to command so considerable a Body of Men, as was reckoned would be employed under them in this Expedition, it being computed they would amount to 11,000 Men, when assembled together, were too few, and not of sufficient Experience, for the proper and happy conducting of any great Design. The several Gentlemen that were appointed to command them were very worthy and brave Men, and would certainly have behaved like good Soldiers as inferior Officers; but the Complaint was, that it was our and their Misfortune, that they had not more and bet-

* *A Review of the late Motion, &c.* Printed for W. Ward, *Salisbury-Court, Fleet-street.*

ter Experience than could be learned in our *Hyde-Park* Camps and Reviews ; whilst we every Day saw in Parliament a great Number of old experienced Officers, from whom more might have reasonably been expected : But they, to be sure, were thought more usefully employed in the Assistance they gave the Publick in the House ; and therefore not one of them was sent. Indeed one compassionate Argument too was urged in their Favour ; that their long Services had merited much ; and should they be sent, it was to almost certain Death. They were excused ; but there still remained some that had not the good Fortune to get into Parliament : And as no Nation, to be sure, was ever so wisely and greatly general-officer'd, as we were, it was extreme ill Conduct, upon both these Accounts, not to have sent some of more Experience, and many more in Number. The very Excuse allowed to some, is a Proof how highly blameable it was to trust the whole in a manner upon the Life of one Man ; and the Fewness of the general Officers under him, can only be justified by the Presumption of their Immortality ; though the Men were nevertheless to be looked upon, as so many sacrificed to *an infatuated, poisoned, deluded Nation, that had forced the Minister into this War.*

This Want of old experienced Officers, as well as old rais'd disciplin'd Soldiers, appears
very

very plainly in the Attempt against *Carthagena*. The Loss of the Lord *Cathcart*, who had seen something, though perhaps not much of Service abroad, devolved the Command upon another, who had not had the same Advantages: The ill Success that has attended it, will certainly occasion, as it loudly calls for, the laying of this Affair openly and entirely before the Parliament; and since it does not so immediately affect and endanger our Sovereign Director and Protector, *the Minister*, this probably will not be refused, since the Execution of the Design, it may be thought, can only be blamed in consequence of this Enquiry. It is therefore unnecessary to trouble you now with a Detail, and Observations on the several Facts alledged in private Letters, as the Cause of our ill Success there, but shall only take Notice of what has been done here, for supplying our Forces there, with hopes of better Success.

Our great Losses before *Carthagena*, greatly occasioned too by the Forces going so late from *Europe* last Year, called loudly for, and demonstrated the Necessity of a great and early Supply, as well as the Loss of Lord *Cathcart*, and the Success there, for another chief and more general Officers. Instead of doing all these Things that were become so absolutely necessary, only 3000 Soldiers are sent to supply the Loss of 7000; instead of sailing earlier this Year, they did not attempt it till

as late as they went last Year; as if that would prove they went soon enough then; but they were unfortunately even longer delayed now. Instead of any other, or more general Officers, to shew it is impossible for our Ministers to err in those they appoint to command and govern, which with them is giving Capacity, and Protection even against the natural Effects that might deprive us of such Commanders, they would permit only one Lieutenant-Colonel to be sent as the Head-Officer, with 3000 Men.

This Conduct and Management of the War, necessitates a full, open, and impartial Enquiry in Parliament, if Parliaments are ever to be suffered to be of any future Use to this Nation, and not employed for ministerial Purposes only. In all Times of Distress, and after ill Success in any of our Affairs, when the Nation has placed that Confidence and Support in the Administration, as to expect a suitable Return in either Honour or Profit, it has hitherto been usual to enquire, whether they were disappointed by unavoidable Accidents, or by ill Conduct, Baseness, or Treachery; which has been both for the Advantage of the Nation, and Protection of the Innocent; and this in all Cases that called for it, though the Ministers concerned, were for carrying us into those Measures, and interested in the Success of them,

them, both as to their personal Preservation and Glory ; how much more therefore, in that single Instance in our History, of a Minister's being forced into a War, by what he calls *an infatuated, poisoned, deluded Nation*, which could no longer bear the Oppression, Insults, and Ignominy, of the most contemptible of Enemies, authorised and supported only by his long Course of scandalous and timid Negotiations ; and who nevertheless, when War became unavoidable from his own Measures, had the Confidence to urge against it his own ill Management of our Treasure for almost 20 Years, and the natural Consequence of his own Negotiations and Measures in not leaving us one Ally ?

Such a Minister still presiding over all our Affairs, and governing in every thing, prognosticated the ill Success of a War, our entering into which became the strongest Censure on his past Conduct, and was destructive of those Measures, and that Application of our Treasure, by which he had hitherto supported himself. This Nation was never before reduced to the Situation, that it's Success in War should be shameful to it's Minister ; and it's ill Success, or Misfortunes, which perhaps that very Minister was the Cause of, should be to his Advantage, and the only Justification of his past Conduct. These are stronger Reasons for a strict Examination,

mination than ever before existed in this Nation : Shall this Parliament, therefore, not examine, and see the whole Transactions, which they have always done, when parliamentary Enquiries became necessary, till the Times of the present Administration ? The Parliament's enquiring, if that should happen, only into the Transactions of the executing Officers, and not into the Orders given by those that direct, will prove too much it's Concern for such a Minister, and it's Want of Regard for the Nation, by such a prudent Interposition in his Behalf.—

Having thus given my Thoughts on our *American* Conduct, I shall now proceed to our *European* last Summer, and this Winter's Conduct under *Haddock*.

This last Summer, the Winds proved more favourable to the great Designs entrusted with Sir *John Norris*, than they did last Year ; when they would not part with him out of the Channel : But, in return, he has safely and soundly triumphed farther from home twice this Year, with the largest Cruisers that ever were sent upon such an Expedition. However, they soon were obliged to return home, for want of Provisions, to the no small Impediment of their great Operations of War ; and to the Mortification of those concerned in the Expeditions, that they had not at least pick'd up some Privateers of the

Enemy's, since it might have been of Advantage to the Captors, and of some Service to the Trade of this Nation, and for the Benefit of the Merchants War.

Several useful Secrets have of late been discovered in the Conduct of a Naval War, entirely unknown to our Predecessors: They indeed built great first rate Ships, and second Rates, because our Enemies then had the same; and they used to honour a great Fleet with one of the first, and a few of the second: But when our real and suspected Enemies have none such, it is wise and prudent to make our whole Fleet, in a manner, consist of them. Three First Rates, four Second Rates, with about two more Ships of the Line, is formidable and useful, beyond the Comprehension of those whose Minds, in these Affairs, have been narrowed by Experience. In the same Light such Men behold with Amazement, these great Ships again ordered out upon a Cruise in the Winter, at the Time of Year when, in all our late Wars, such Ships were ordered home and laid up. However right and great all this may be, yet there is one Argument drawn from it in Justification of the Want of Cruisers to protect our Trade, that will not be allow'd; and must be more fully considered.

During the late glorious War with *France*, the Parliament granted annually but 40000 Seamen,

Seamen, including 8000 Marines, which reduces it to 32000 actual Seamen: We now give 40000 Seamen annually, exclusive of the 10000 Marines, which we pay besides; and at present, it is so far from there being any Deficiency of the Number of Seamen granted by Parliament, that the Number which is now employ'd and pay'd, we have been assured, is 52000. What a vast exceeding is this, not only of what is granted, but of what was employ'd, during the last War, both against *France* and *Spain*? And yet, how little has these Numbers protected our Trade against *Spain* alone, or done those necessary or important Services that were justly expected from them? It is true, that being by much the superior Power, will not always carry the desired Success with it; but the never having of any, proves the Fault more in Conduct than in Chance. Ill Success never justifies ill concerted and unsteady Schemes, which at the same time make a Sacrifice to them of the Trade of this Nation: Nor will the Glory of having so many useless great Ships sailing on the Seas, which necessarily employ'd so vast a Number of Hands, be allow'd any Justification for the Want of Men, or for the Want of a few Ships being employ'd for the Protection of our own Channel. The Men of one of those Ships alone, in several Ships, properly statio-

oned, would certainly have done more real Service to us, and would have been more for our Reputation, than this guilded *Arma-dō* was, or than could be justly expected it would be, considering all the Circumstances attending it, and the then disposition of Affairs. And though there are at present no Papers that can help us to the ascertaining of any Facts relating to it, yet the Publick is not entirely at a loss for some Notion of the Causes that were, or probably will be, assign'd, for these mighty Ships thus sailing twice, and leaving no Hands for the Protection of our Trade.

The first time of their sailing, considering the Date of it, had not at that Time even the Appearance of being design'd to hinder the Junction of the two *French* Fleets preparing only then, nor of that at *Brest* with that then at *Cadiz*; but seem'd to be understood and allow'd to have been sent for the intercepting of the imagined Return of the Galleons. A **VERY DESIRABLE EMPLOYMENT!** But surely the taking of all these great Ships for such a Service, was very improper, and could only be done for the sake of disguising that Design, which was extremely unnecessary; for Intelligences of that Sort are too freely communicated; nor is it probable, if ever this Affair should be enquired into, that any sufficient Reason can be assigned, for employing

ploying these great Ships at that Time, rather than making Use of their Hands, for protecting the Trade.

The next time this Fleet of great Ships sailed, was in *October* last, the Design of which, it seems to be agreed, was for hindering the *French* Fleet at *Brest*, from committing some Junction or other; that with *Toulon* was most talked of; but as all Disappointments in our military Operations are to be laid to the Charge of Fortune, not ill Conduct; for a constant Superiority of Force, that has never yet, from the great Prudence and Foresight of our Ministers, disappointed the Designs of our secret or open Enemies, will by them alone be attributed to nothing else; it seem'd extremely surprizing to the Publick, that this Fleet did not sail, till they were generally informed, that the *French* were actually laying aside the Appearance of any Squadron's sailing from *Brest* this Year. Yet the Reason alledged, whether true or false, we know, was the preventing of that very *Brest* Squadron's joining that of *Toulon*; for that of *Cadiz* was then sufficiently blocked up by Admiral *Haddock*, and no Apprehensions of any Dangers from thence to our Scheme in *Europe*. The two *French* Squadrons engross'd the whole Attention of our Ministers; but what their Apprehensions were of the joining of these Squadrons, and what they were then

then to do, it is believed, will ever remain a most profound Secret.

During these two last Years, our Ministers have been possessed with nothing but Fears of the Junction of Squadrons, to such a Degree, as to think *France* incapable of acting upon any other Design; which probably would have been the most fatal to them, as it was the most impolitick one; because it would have immediately forced them into War, whilst, at the same Time, it had not that Prospect of Success to them, and Distress to us, as those they more wisely laid. But surely, to any Set of Men not possessed by Fear, and that had the Success of the War at Heart, the dear-bought Experience of last Year would have convinced them, that *France* was capable of other and better laid Designs than Junctions of Fleets for naval Battles in *Europe* only. Their Attention to the several Parts of the War, would at least have made them attend to more mighty and certain Preparations of a different kind, confirmed and known by repeated Advices for several Months past, which more evinced the real Designs of those abroad, than the imaginary Apprehensions of those at home, who can see Things only in one Point of Sight.
If our Ministers could but at this Time, late as it was, have attended to the *Mediterranean* and *Haddock*, surely it would have been

been better to have reinforced him with several Ships, rather than send this fine Squadron upon such a useless Winter's Cruize but that they should not have dispatched Part of that Squadron at least to him, after it had performed that useless Service it was sent upon, seems very unaccountable, and what calls highly for Parliamentary Animadversion. His present Situation, and the Management of the War there, is, by some surprizing Incidents, become a Matter of the greatest Importance to *Europe*, and more particularly calls for an Examination in Parliament. It is impossible thoroughly to consider this Affair, without entering into the strange Revolutions that have happened in *Europe* this Summer, to the Amusement of us all; which I shall do in as short a Manner as possible, and no farther than I think is absolutely necessary to be seen, at the same time we consider this Part of the Conduct of the War.

I shall not enter into the Situation of Affairs between the two Courts of *Prussia* and *Hanover*, as they stood at the Time of the Death of the late Emperor, nor of the Disputes that affected only the German Dominions, nor of any Family Concerns that may any ways have affected, or related to any Transactions, in which this Nation has been, or is interested. But it is certain, the King of *Prussia*'s falling upon *Silesia*, as it gave a Diversion

version to his Forces, it gave Ease to the Apprehensions of his Neighbours, who might be glad thus to see him employ his Forces, where it was not then likely to be attended with any Success to him; or any Encrease of Power, that should the more endanger them hereafter. This private Interest coinciding so much with the publick Interest of all *Europe*, no doubt, occasioned the strongest Assurances of Support to the Queen of *Hungary*, for the general Cause; and the Private one of not aggrandizing that Prince, was far from lessening the Desire of preserving the Totality of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*. The strong Assurance given the Queen of *Hungary*, the visible Interest that appeared in it, together with our actual Preparations and vigorous Resolutions, confirmed and strengthened her in that Perseverance that had been before desired; which, as it might have created an Obstinacy in her in that Respect, it certainly made the Desires and the Situation of his *Prussian* Majesty more desperate, and necessitated him to look out for any Ally or Support whatsoever, though the most abhorred, or the most contrary to his Inclinations. As this necessarily forced him into the Arms of *France*, so it made *France* (who had no Prospect of Success, or any Designs before of breaking through the Pragmatick Sanction, which they had guaranteed, and had then declared,

declared, and given the strongest Assurances, that they would keep it) enter into those Measures that have proved the Ruin of the House of *Austria*, and of the Balance of Power in *Europe*. — Let us consider, that the taking of the *Danes* and *Hessians* into full Pay, and their having been ordered for the Service of the Queen of *Hungary*, was communicated to Parliament last Year, in the Speech from the Throne, that desired the Vote of Credit for the same Use.—Was not *Prussia* immediately to have submitted upon this? Or, if he did not, was it not meant, to force him into the desired Submission? Was there any Apprehensions, at that Time, that *France* did so much as dare to meddle in this Affair? The very Application and Design of this Force against *Prussia*, alone sufficiently proves, that nothing was dreaded from thence: But, if the contrary is to be supposed, it is a much more criminal Charge against the Minister, since the Tendency of it, was the strengthening the Arms of *France*, and throwing in her Way that Opportunity, which in this Case even our *Ministers* must be supposed to have imagined she wanted; which was the very reason for not approving this Measure, when it was first communicated to the Publick. The Event has proved it too true, to the great Concern of many of the sincerest Friends to the House of *Austria*, who were

G

glad

glad of that Opportunity to do any Thing for supporting that House, which had been so long endeavoured to be lessened by the opposite Interest and Scheme of our Ministers; but the Hands it was entrusted with, and the several clashing Interests of the Powers concerned, was sufficient to disappoint their Wishes.

We thus, at a very great Expence to ourselves, made that very Expence the unfortunate Cause of the deplorable Situation of the House of *Austria*, whilst, at the same Time, none of his Majesty's Forces were of any Service to that House. Indeed it has been said, that the Fear of his and our Forces in *Germany*, created so favourable a Diversion to the Queen of *Hungary*, as to prevent her Army from being entirely routed by the *Prussians*, which it might have been, if his Majesty's *British* and Foreign Troops had not occasioned a Division of their Forces. But even this Prevention of her utter Defeat, was the most unfortunate Thing that could, or did befall her, to the gfeat Disappointment of her real Friends, who wished and desired, that she might part with something to *Prussia*, for the Preservation of the rest. It strengthened and confirmed her in the Opinion, so much adapted to her own Interest, and in the Dependance she had on being supported by *Saxony*, and another more considerable Power,

in

in preferring the Indivisibility of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*; because the Increase of Country and States to *Prussia*, was dangerous to all his Neighbours. Suppose they thought, they could submit to it with Safety; yet the Idea of his Greatness might have lessened them too much even in their own Esteem; and this appears plainly, as to *Saxony*, by his Manifesto, to have been his Interest and View; for he declares his first Engagements to have been for preserving the Totality of the *Austrian* Dominions, but since he found that was not to be done, he was for getting as much as he could for himself.

In respect to the conjunctive Powers and Views of *England* and *Hanover* enough has been said, and need not to be further proved; which makes it only necessary to observe, that his *Prussian* Majesty lost the now so much desired complete Victory, by being forced to keep such an Army of Observation on *Hanover*. But having mentioned this Army, let us a little consider the Cause, and the Effects and Consequences that have attended it: The Cause undoubtedly was, that he thought it absolutely necessary for his securely obtaining and enjoying what he professed he had a just Claim to; because thence he expected such Obstructions, as made it necessary for him so unluckily to divide his Forces, for Reasons best

best known to himself, and which the Publick is not altogether ignorant of. The Station of this Army of his at *Magdebourg* was so convenient, so properly placed, that the principal Part of the Electorate of *Hanover* might have been destroyed by it in almost four and twenty Hours. It's own Forces, however brave, were too few for it's Preservation. It is immaterial to know, whether or no his *Prussian* Majesty signified this Superiority of his, so far as to design, at least to prevent the *Danes*, the *Hessians*, all hired by us, as well as the 10,000 *English* that were to have been transported to *Germany*, from moving to the protecting of that Electorate, and *Ally to Great Britain*. It is sufficient for us to know, and be glad, that our own Forces were preserved at home, and to be sorry for the ridiculous Appearance of the *Danes* at the *Elbe*, when all was over. To any one who considers that finishing Stroke, the *Hanover* Neutrality, this Army of *Prussia* appears plainly and strongly, in it's Consequences, to have operated. But to our more immediate Point at present.

It has been, and will be urged, that after his Majesty arrived at *Hanover*, for some Time his *Prussian* Majesty was willing to treat with the Queen of *Hungary*, through the Canal, or, if you please, the Mediation of his Majesty. A thorough Information of this

this whole Affair, as well as all relating to these crown'd Heads, can only be known by communicating to the Parliament all that passed between them and their Ministers; and if ours should never be for suffering That to be produced, if it is for their Service to keep this Nation in Ignorance as to these Transactions, it is from that Information alone, which private People arrive at, either by Intelligence, Observation, or Reasoning, that you must expect any Thing from me, in considering these great and very important Affairs. Errors are not wilful, when we know no better Method for coming at the Truth; nor is the Nation to be misled, and kept in the dark, because ministerial Safety will not permit it to see the Light.

It is necessary, in considering this Point, to view the immediate Situation then of these three several Powers. His Majesty, who had every Thing prepared and ready, set out from hence for *Germany*, all-powerful, and with the Hopes not only of an immediate Submission from *Prussia*, but, by his Power, to create and influence a free Election of the Duke of *Tuscany* to the Imperial Diadem; but found himself at *Hanover*, without that numerous Army that was to have been gathered there for these great Purposes, or any Part of it; while *Prussia* had a great Army in his Neighbourhood.

bourhood. A very pleasing, proper, and easy Situation for a Mediator, and probably was considered so, at least by the King of *Prussia*, if not by the Queen of *Hungary*. One requisite Qualification for a Mediator is, that the Thing to be mediated should be known to both the Parties, to be the real Desire, and not against the Interest or Engagements of the Mediator. The one ought not to suspect, the other know the contrary, much less both of them know the whole; or that it was only a necessitated Mediation that was accepted of. It were to be wished too, that his Majesty had first finally settled and adjusted all the Disputes between him and the King of *Prussia*, which was so necessary a Beginning, and would have been a Blessing we should have now rejoiced in, for his *Prussian* Majesty's Sake and our own, as he is the most natural Ally and Friend to his Majesty's *British* Dominions; which, if it had been done, would have had the Appearance of a better qualified Mediator.

The Situation of *Prussia* at this Time was, victorious over the Queen of *Hungary* and superior to *Hanover*, whilst at the same time not a Man was stirred, nor could safely be stirred, or those mighty Things done against him, with which he was threaten'd; and yet he was even then so unwilling to engage with *France*, that he was willing to treat, upon

the

the Condition of obtaining only what he claimed and insisted on as his Right, when he first engaged in this War. From these Demands of his, the manner of the Negotiation by this Sort of Mediation, and the Refusal of what were very reasonable Terms at that Time, it appears, and one of the Reasons alledged for this Refusal by the Court of *Vienna*, viz. the parting with a Catholic Country to a Protestant, shews us plainly, that it was so far from ever being design'd, at any Time before, to have made up with him, if any of the Dominions of the House of *Austria* were to be parted with for Peace and his Assistance, that it could never have been so much as mention'd before; which demonstrates that all our Negotiations there, till that Hour, were upon Principles quite different from what this sudden Turn, so contrary to all our past Measures and Engagements, alarmed them with.

It is scarce possible, considering the Situation of the Queen of *Hungary* to that fatal Hour, that she could conceive, or probably be acquainted with the Alterations that were made in every Part of the Scheme of his *Britannick* Majesty's Assistance, from Causes that Appearances would not justify to her, and were then of so tender and delicate a Nature, as possibly might not be thought proper to be communicated entirely to her; nor could the Necessity

Necessity of her complying from thence sufficiently appear, considering that she had till then remained fully persuaded, and firmly relied on the Engagements of *Saxony*, *Great Britain*, and *Hanover*, and the strong Assurances received from *France*, which were for some time sincere: Nor was it possible for them to conceive at *Vienna*, that the Preparations and Resolutions here, were not founded on obliging the King of *Prussia* to make up with her, without having any Part of her Dominions; and on the Certainty we were in here, that *France* would not engage in this Quarrel, or that if she did, Things were so prepared and settled, and such Alliances formed and concluded, that nothing was to be apprehended from *France*, but much to be fear'd by her.

We could even scarce credit it ourselves, for a long time, that all our mighty Preparations and Designs should have been so conducted, that not a Man should stir on account of our Engagements, nor of our Alliances, for the giving of any Assistance whatsoever; and yet that the *French* Troops should no sooner be in Motion towards *Westphalia*, than (as they say) a Neutralitie was begun for *Hanover*. The Surprise, no doubt, was equally great at *Vienna*; where, had the Weakness of that Alliance been fully drawn to her before, she must have

have more willingly agreed with *Prussia*, as she was desirous of doing, when it was seen, and was too late. The engaging of the Electoral Vote too for *Bavaria*, and the manner in which it was said to be done, was equally astonishing to all. But the Weakness of expecting Succours from *Hanover*, and the Weakness of *Hanover* itself, begun then to be evident; for though it was before sufficiently over-awed by the *Prussian* Army at *Magdeburg*, which much more necessitated the Neutrality than the *French* March; yet the March of these Troops immediately forced the exposing of the hidden State of that Electorate, which had hitherto been concealed to all.

France, from Experience, and from the Assistance she gave, during the Reigns of his late and present Majesty, to the Views and Interest of the Electorate of *Hanover*, both in the North and the Empire, was fully convinced of the Weakness of that Electorate, and how sensibly it had, and would affect all the Operations of *Great Britain*. The lessening the exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*, had united the Interest and Views of that Electorate with those of *France*; and the *Hanover* Treaty, and our hiring then such Numbers of Troops, were for the Protection of those Parts, being the only Use we could have for such Troops; and our calling

on her for Assistance, by Virtue of that Treaty, was for the saving of that Electorate from the Hands of the *Prussians*, from whom an Attack was then apprehended, on account of a Quarrel about a few Cart Loads of Hay. These were Facts and Causes fully known to *France*, and shew'd the real State of the Interest and Power of *Hanover* in respect to any of it's Neighbours, the Impossibility of it's defending itself alone against most of it's Neighbours, and much more it's being able to extend it's Dominions by it's own Power; the whole having, to their Knowledge, so much depended upon the connected, and not to be separated Interest and Power of *England*; which by these Means has come to be placed, and design'd to be attacked, as if we were Part of the Continent. The great Benefit of being an Island, and not to be attacked by *France*, or any other Enemy, has been lost to us: All the Powers on the Continent have long been persuaded, and are now fully convinced of this: The *Hanover* Treaty first fully shewed it the Publick, the *Hanover* Neutrality now proves it beyond Contradiction. *France* depended upon this, and made it the principal Object of the Success of her whole Designs. The Event has prov'd, how well she knew the Consequence of her sending an Army into *Westphalia*; and how from thence every thing must fall before her,

her, and turn to the Advantage of all her Allies, and of *Spain* in particular.

It may be said, indeed, that the *Act* of Neutrality for *Hanover*, no ways relates to *Great Britain*, which, simply consider'd in those Words, no Man can doubt of; for the identical Instrument, called the *Act of Neutrality* for *Hanover*, cannot be, nor ever was supposed to be, so absurd, as in that very Instrument to contain Stipulations that related to *Great Britain*; the very signing of it by a *German* Minister, and not an *English* one, ought alone sufficiently to prove it: But the Thing to be consider'd, is not the wording of an *Act* that was certainly most carefully worded, to avoid every thing of that Nature; but whether or no the Means of obtaining that *Act*, and the Consequences of it, do not relate to, and essentially affect *Great Britain*: Which surely no Man can dispute, since it so immediately took from us, and robbed us of the Assistance of that very Ally, that was the dearest and most inseparable from us, I mean the Electorate of *Hanover*; and at the same Time rendered useless and unnecessary, the Expence of 12000 *Danes* and *Hessians*, that were to be paid for affliting the Queen of *Hungary*, and that as yet had done nothing towards it.

But there are other more material Interests of this Nation, that have the strongest Ap-

pearance of being interwoven in this Neutrality, and the Nation has been greatly alarmed with it, since there is too much Reason to believe what they have seen and heard relating to it. Before I enter into an Examination, or make any Observation on those several Facts, it will be necessary to shew you, by way of Illustration, that several Acts done by his late Majesty as Elector, as well as verbal Engagements that related to the most essential Parts of the Negotiations, which in the first Appearance did not, but consequentially and immediately did draw in *Great Britain*. The first to be mentioned for this Purpose, is the Treaty between his Majesty and the King of *Denmark*, for the purchasing of *Bremen* and *Verden*, in *July 1715*, before he had been a Year upon this Throne; beside the Money to be given for it, his *Britannick* Majesty was, in consequence of it, to declare War against *Sweden*; * and we are informed too, that there was a Clause for an offensive League, but that his Majesty left out that Word, and engaged himself verbally †. The Effect of this verbal Engagement soon shewed itself, not only by his Majesty's Declaration of War, as Elector, in *November*, but by the *Swedish* Memorial presented to the Lord *Townshend* here, the 14th of *October* before, || taking

* *Lembury*, Vol. 9. p. 295. † *Ditto*, p. 298. || *Ditto*, p. 297.

Notice of the eight Men of War, of ours, in those Parts being to join the *Danes*; and takes Notice of it's being to be in Pursuance of the Treaty concluded for *Bremen* and *Verden*. The next Year Sir *John Norris* was sent with a great Fleet into the *Baltick*, to the Distress of *Sweden*; and this Nation was thereby at last involved in an open War against that Nation, the Original of which you see by the Commencement, and the Conclusion further proves it; which is chiefly what this Affair is mentioned for. Our Fleets were annually, at a great Expence, sent there, till *Sweden* was willing to sell and give up her Rights to *Bremen* and *Verden*. *France* then became the Mediator between their *British* and *Swedish* Majesties; and under that Mediation a Treaty of Peace was concluded between *Sweden* and *Great Britain*, by which those Dutches are given to *Hanover*, and Money to *Sweden*, in that most extraordinary Manner, of having the whole transacted and signed by his Electoral Minister only; and yet he not only engaged this Nation to comply with that Peace, but the 8th Article is, *That his Majesty promises, by these Presents, not only as King, but Elector, to renew immediately their ancient Alliances and Friendship, &c.* In consequence of this Stipulation of the *Hanover* Minister, who made the Peace, we find a Treaty of Alliance accordingly concluded between

between the Ministers of the two Crowns, the 21st of January 1720; and though no written Stipulations appear, yet the Effect of verbal ones at least appear: For the English Fleet, that hitherto had been sent against them, was immediately sent for their Support, and for the Distress of one of those very Powers, for whose Use it before was employed there. And we find, that in the Debates in Sweden, whether or no they should accept the Subsidy, which we sent a great Fleet into the Baltic to induce them to do, and accede to the Hanover Treaty, it was strongly urged against it, that the Fleet that was formerly sent under Sir John Norris had not done them the Services, nor performed what was promised them.

These were therefore Engagements of the same secret Nature as others, that do not appear in the Treaties concluded between the Powers, and were what would not bear the Light: And, to give one Instance more, even where it may be thought that only the Interest of this Nation was concerned, I shall mention the Offer and verbal Engagement of Lord Stanhope to the Regent, and afterwards to Spain, of giving up Gibraltar, if Spain should come into the quadruple Alliance, without giving any farther Disturbance to Europe: This, it is true, was vacated by the War that was afterwards commenced; notwithstanding which

which our Peace, and all our Transactions,
have ever since turn'd very much upon this
verbal Engagement.

Having thus given you, in as short and concise a Manner as possible, an Illustration of Engagements of a publick Nature, and of verbal ones too, that in the first Instance and Appearance were only Acts that affected the Interest of *Hanover* singly, yet the End and Means of obtaining those Advantages were the Acts of *England* in consequence of them; I shall proceed in observing several Facts that preceded the *Hanover* Neutrality, and those that have followed it, by which we may the better perceive how far it does or may affect *Great Britain*.

His Majesty was not long abroad, before the Publick was alarmed here, without knowing the real Cause, that some extraordinary Demands and Proposals of Negotiations were made here by the *French* Minister, M. *Bussy*, to the Lords Justices; and the Answer, as then reported, was, that the Subject of them was of such a Nature, that they could not treat of them, but that he must treat of them with his Majesty. If this any ways related to *Hanover*, it is not at all surprising, that he should be referred entirely to his Majesty; but it would be extremely so, if it no ways related to this Nation, that the *French* Minister should propose to enter here into a Negotiation with-

out his Majesty, as to what concerned *Hanover* alone. M. *Buffy* soon after left this Kingdom; and Letters from *Hanover* of the 8th of September, N. S. acquainted us of the Arrival of M. *Buffy* there, of his having had his first Audience of his Majesty, and that Lord *Harrington* was ordered to confer with him; —that he had two Conferences with him, and that the Subject-matter was the Differences between *Great Britain* and *France*, the Affairs of the Empire, and the present War with *Spain*. If this was true, it proves every Thing; and indeed *France* was not in the Situation of Complaisance to keep any unnecessary Secrets for the Benefit of our Administration, as will appear more fully afterwards. But supposing only the Facts of the Conferences and the Persons negotiating to be true, does it not prove, that the Beginning and Introduction of Affairs was treated of, in Pursuance of the Instructions he was sent with, as Matters relating to *Great Britain*? As yet we know of no other interfering of the German Ministers, than the signing of the very *Act of Neutrality*, which does not relate to *England* by any Words therein inserted.

But *France* would have negotiated here: *France* too began this Negotiation, of which this *Act* was a Part, with the *English* Minister at *Hanover*. What is the Conclusion, if it is not

not, that *France* did design, and did then treat of Matters which related to, and affected this Nation ? To our Sorrow, they are become a too knowing and mighty Nation to be trifled with. They would despise that mean Quibble design'd for home Use only, the present desired Distinction of separating the Interests and Engagements of *Hanover* and *England*. They were too wise, when they had the first of these Dominions at their Mercy, without it's having any possible Assistance from this Nation, or any other, to spare it, only for the Sake of sparing it. They knew too well, how *England* was, and could be held by it ; an Opportunity they would not part with, without obtaining whatever they desired from this Nation : Even yet, they will not let it escape, till that is complied with by us, which they may have just Reason to expect should be performed in Pursuance of Engagements, whether written or verbal, as the Price of it ; and the State in which they still keep that Electorate, seems the only Means of obtaining it.

It is unnecessary to enter into any long Detail, of either the *Hanover* Minister being at *Paris*, or the Letter of his Majesty, promising his Vote to the Elector of *Bavaria*; the Manner and Time of doing it, or Mr. Trevor's denying, by Authority, to the States-General, the making of the Act of Neutrality.

trality. These are Points of a more minute Consideration at present. Sufficient for us it is to know; that it was concluded in September; and to see the Sense and Purport of the whole of the Agreement, in the immediate and declared Sense of France, which she so soon after, as the 2d of October, N. S. communicated to the States-General, by her Minister, M. Fenelon, and which was, (according to our Informations from thence) *That the King of England had demanded of the King of France the Neutrality for his German Dominions, and that that Monarch promised not to give any Succours to the Queen of Hungary, nor to oppose the DESIGNS of France's Allies; that, moreover, his Britan-nick Majesty had given his Vote to the Elector of Bavaria to be Emperor; and at the same Time declared, that he was disposed to accommodate Matters with Spain, upon the Conditions that his most CHRISTIAN MAJESTY shall judge the most reasonable and equitable.*

Did ever France make so glorious a Figure before? Was there ever a more clear or shorter State of the Advantage obtained by her? By the first Part of this Declaration, indeed, it appears plainly, that the Act of Neutrality is for his Majesty's German Dominions alone, and does not take in England into the Stipulation of Safety and no Loss: But how does the Conclusion relate to England, with regard to

to the Consequence of the thus demanded, and thus granted Neutrality ?

Before we enter into the particular Examination of the several Points contained in this Declaration, let it be observed, that this was the Declaration of a publick Minister of *France*, in a Place and Manner in which it was impossible it should not be known to all *Europe*, as it is ; which, if false and groundless, would have been contradicted by as publick Authority, and in as publick a Manner. Nothing of which has appeared : No Mitigations, or lessening of it, or Explanations, have been attempted, not even at home, by the lowest Tools of ministerial Imposition. The Publick here has a Right to be informed of all extraordinary Alterations or Events that may affect them or *Europe*, as asserted by this very Administration, in their famous Enquiry for justifying the Measures of the *Hanover* Treaty. The Speech from the Throne, at the Meeting of a Parliament, formerly acquainted them and the Nation, of the general State of Affairs, and of any material Alterations that had intervened since their last Separation. His Majesty's last Speech proves too much by it's Silence on every Head, which the Nation expected to be informed of ; and as to which their Uneasiness and Apprehensions could no ways be quieted, but by the Declarations of so great

an Authority ; instead of which, the Speech, as to these Affairs, appeals entirely to, and calls upon the Parliament for Counsel, in these very remarkable and express Words, That he makes no Doubt but that you are met together fully sensible of our present Situation, and prepared to give him such Advice, &c.

How are you, or any Member of Parliament, or this Nation in general, sensible of our present Situation ? unless it be allowed and admitted, as it never yet has been contradicted, that the Accounts we have received, and have been mentioned, of the foreign Transactions of his Majesty and other Powers, are true. Without this, it is even impossible to suppose or imagine, that you could be prepared to give him Advice, at the Meeting of the Parliament, before any Thing was communicated to you from the Throne, or by the Ministers. You must not therefore be surprized, if the Ministers should be for refusing you the entire and proper Lights for examining into these Affairs any further, since it is already declared, you are fully sensible of them ; and that what was, and is generally known and believed, of these Things, undenied by them, is true ; consequently the producing of these Papers relating to these Affairs, can be of no other Use, than as Proofs to support a Charge against them.

Having

Having premised thus, I shall consider and argue upon the several Matters contained in the Declaration of M. Fenelon, as undeniable Facts, and farther, I shall endeavour to prove them so, or at least, that subsequent Transactions have corresponded with them so far, as no otherwise to be accountable for, from what yet appears.

The first which I shall mention, and which brings me back to the Observation of the Conduct of the War against *Spain*, is, that his Majesty *promised not to give any Succours to the Queen of Hungary, nor to oppose the Designs of the Allies of France*. Had it been the Elector of *Hanover* only that made this Promise, this Part of the Act of Neutrality could no ways relate to *England*. But his Majesty is treated with by all Powers abroad as our Monarch, without it is expressly declared otherwise; and *France* is not to be trifled with in this Distinction; for the Article relating to *Spain* fully proves, that they understood the whole to be promised in his Regal Capacity.

Spain is certainly one of those Allies of *France*, that had Designs against the *Queen of Hungary*, and which *France*, to be sure, was desirous should not be opposed: *Spain* has ventured to send to *Italy* above 200 Transports,

Transports, from that open Road of *Barcelona*, convoy'd by three Men of War only; and the Marquis *De St. Gilles*, the Spanish Minister, declared at the *Hague*, that those Troops would go, and very easily too, there being no Obstruction. Had they not the Gift of Knowledge?

In considering the Conduct of our Fleet at this Time, it is necessary just to recal, that the hiring of four Transports at *Barcelona* to carry great Guns, and a great List of General Officers, without any Troops ready to embark, not long ago, so alarm'd our Ministers, that all our Fleet was to go and protect *Minorca* against this formidable Embarkation, which then gave Occasion to the letting out the *Cadiz* Squadron. Having mention'd this, I shall take Notice, that the Spaniards had now, for several Months, been making real Preparations for an Embarkation at the same Place, which was no Secret to any Part of *Europe*, much less to our Ministers at home, or Officers in the *Mediterranean*. The last were, no doubt, sufficiently concerned at it, and acquainted our Ministers with it, and had, or desired, proper Orders relating to it. Yet notwithstanding our great Superiority in those Seas, the Enemy were suffer'd to sail away un molested, undisturbed, without so much as a Ship being sent by us to hinder them: Three
at 1000 hours
 or

or four would have destroy'd and sunk the whole Embarkation, yet we stirred not. What *French Remora* prevented it? Shall the Neutrality be mentioned, or shall it be ascribed to our Fears of the *French Fleet*, and that therefore we did not dare to send a Part of our Forces? If that be the Case, it is the only one in which we could wish the Act of Neutrality related to, and included us. But if that was the Reason why a few Ships were not sent, it became the more absolutely necessary that our Admiral should have gone with his whole Fleet. If the whole was not sufficient, why was there not a Reinforcement sent? We had Ships enough at home, and our Ministers had timely Notice. By all Means Care should have been taken, not to suffer the Glory and Reputation of this Nation to be fullied, by the bullying Sailing only of a *French Squadron*, which, probably, was as unwilling to fight as others; considering the Character of that brave and worthy Admiral, who is so justly and universally esteemed, that this Neglect can be accounted for no Way, but by saying, that it either proceeded from some Orders he had, perhaps of the Non-ostensible Sort, or from the Want of proper Orders and Instructions how to behave with Regard to the *French Fleet*. In either of these Cases, our Ministers must be guilty: In any Case that can be put, some
one

one must be guilty, and answerable for this Neglect, which so loudly calls for a strict parliamentary Enquiry, that the Conduct of this Nation can no other Way be accounted for to our People at home, or justified to our Friends abroad, if the Conduct of our Administration has left us any; and no such Enquiry can be made, unless the whole be produced: Every Instruction, Order, and Letter to him, from those whom he was to obey, and every Letter of his to any of them, must be laid before you. But if, instead of this, which our present Situation absolutely demands, the Minister should be desirous of amusing you, and spending your Time in useless, partial, and thereby sham Enquiries, I hope you will prefer the Honour and Interest of your Country, to the satisfying of his Desires. A pidling Genius would, in these critical Times, confine your Enquiry to the Orders, &c. relating to the War against *Spain* only, which would secrete that Part in which our Ministers are supposed the most guilty, and upon which the whole must turn. The Embarkation from *Barcelona*, may then be looked upon only as the War with *Spain* against the Queen of *Hungary*; and it will be said, you have no Right to see any Orders given, or to observe or censure the Omision of any that affect the *not opposing the Designs of the Allies of France against her.*

The

The plausible Argument to the Publick for his, as well as the true, real, and private one to the Ministers and their Friends, will be, that the producing the whole will shew the Instructions that were given to *Haddock*, with regard to any Operations of the *French*, which, they will say, may involve you in a War with that Nation. Let the Consequence be what it will, this is the very Thing that is now become the most necessary to be seen; It is that upon which alone the whole depends, and which therefore must, by our Ministers, be the most desired to be secreted: But as this secreting will be the sole Defence, it is necessary to consider it a little more fully, together with the several Operations of private or open, though not declared Enmity, between us and *France*, concerning the War with *Spain*. *France* was uneasy at the first Commencement of the War, and our Minister stood in such Fear of her, that for that only, he was not for entering into it. Both these Circumstances we know; and no sooner did the News of the taking of *Porto Bello* arrive in *France*, but they were pretty explicite on that Head. A great Fleet was immediately prepared by them; they restored the Harbour of *Dunkirk*, and erected some Fortifications there: They published a Declaration in all the Courts of *Europe*, containing the Reasons for their sending a Fleet to the *West Indies*: His Majesty informed the last Parliament of their Designs for limit-

K ing

ing his Operations in the Prosecution of the War against *Spain*; and the Parliament came to as strong assurances as the Minister desired. The sending of this Fleet of theirs, occasioned our sending there 27 great Ships, when but 6 were originally design'd for the Convoy of our Transports; and it has happen'd too, that the hostile Orders of that *French* Fleet fell into the Hands of Admiral *Vernon*; which as it is no Secret here, it can be none in *France* that we know them; no more than it can be a Secret there, what was known to every Man in that great combined Fleet under Admiral *Vernon*, that the first Design he went on, was to find out the *French* Fleet, to our great and essential Loss of Time; and that he would not pursue the intended Expedition, till he was assured of their Return to *Europe*; which surely the *French* do not take as designed only for a civil Visit, or a civil Salute; and proves to them, beyond a Doubt, what they ought to expect from our Admirals in *Europe*; for what Grounds can they have to suspect more timid Orders in *Europe*, than in *America*?

Whatever Notions the *French* may formerly have entertain'd of the Effects of bullying our Administration, yet they must be sensible of the different Situation of our Ministers, now that they are engaged in a War, carry'd on and entered into by Parliament, against their expressed Dislike and Opposition. What have we more to fear from *France* than

than we do at present? What can we apprehend more from her knowing the Words of *Haddock's Orders*, than from her knowing the Purport of *Vernon's*? She must sufficiently know the Purport and Tendency of *Haddock's*, if any, or proper ones were sent him with regard to her, which thus alone becomes a Question, by their being desired not to be produced. *France*, of all others, could no ways be offended, or object to them, let them be never so vigorous; not only after what has passed between us, but from the Nature and Situation of Affairs in the *Mediterranean*. *Haddock's Orders*, if he had any relating to *France*, must have depended and turn'd intirely upon the previous Actions of *France*; for what we were to have done must have been subsequent. Were we attacked, or our Enemies defended by them, should we have been afraid of resisting, or attacking them? Shall we now scruple in the least to let them know that we should not? Must nothing but downright Cowardice be supposed on our Side? Will an Enemy the more insult and despise us, or expect to force the worst Terms upon us, for that, or for knowing that we had, like a brave People, determined to retort the Injury, and defend ourselves, with that Spirit this Nation has been used to shew against the Aggressor? A previous Attack from *France*, or an Attempt to defend our Enemies against our just Resentment, could alone be the Foundation of any

proper Orders sent to *Haddock*, relating to her. Shall we be afraid to let her know, that, in this Case, our Admiral was provided with proper Orders? No Englishman will say so; and therefore, if any of *Haddock's* Orders be secreted, it must be to blind and conceal what relates more to Persons at home, than to any of the Powers abroad.

Having thus given my Thoughts on the past Conduct of the War, there remains but one Thing more to be mentioned, which is, the carrying it on with Vigour, or the submitting to such a Peace as *France* shall mediate between us and *Spain*. You have already observed, that the Account of the Neutrality given by the *French* Minister to the States-General, says, that his Majesty was disposed to accommodate Matters with Spain, upon the Conditions that his most Christian Majesty shall judge the most reasonable and equitable. I shall not again mention any Thing of the undisturbed Embarkation from *Barcelona*; nor the several minute Intelligences from *Spain* and other Parts, that might corroborate what is sufficiently understood; but shall, after what has been already said, consider this Question now only as it stands in his Majesty's Speech, where, speaking of the War with Spain, he says, *A War, in itself just and necessary, entered into by the repeated Advice of both Houses of Parliament, and particularly recommended to him to be carried on in America, which has been his principal Care;*

Care; and therefore calls for the Advice of Parliament in a particular Manner: But to our great Sorrow and Surprize, after all this, we do not find one Word in the Speech tending to the carrying on of the War any longer. So remarkable an Omission, after all we have heard from abroad relating to the future carrying of it on, is a Matter of the greatest Concern and Dejection to all his Majesty's well-meaning Subjects. They were too much alarmed before with what they hoped false Accounts and Reports of his Majesty's Disposition for a Peace with *Spain*, and of his coming over, to take the Advice of Parliament on that Head; but their Reliance on the Wisdom of the Administration, and on the Zeal of our Ministers for the Honour of this Nation, made them expect, that some Paragraph of the Speech would entirely silence all such malicious Reports, by a vigorous Declaration for continuing the War against *Spain*; instead of which, to their great Disappointment, they find Futurity left to *your being fully sensible of our present Situation, and prepared to give him such Advice, &c.*

The Comments that will be made abroad upon this Manner of asking the Advice of Parliament in this Affair, and the Preparations necessary for giving it, may be Matter of Mirth and Sport to them, but of deadly Reflections to us: The whole is a Subject at present of too delicate a Nature for me to animadvert upon, even with that Freedom

which

which the Subject seems to require ; and therefore I shall turn your Thoughts to another Way of examining and considering it, by the subsequent Explanations that shall be given to it in Parliament.

The Speeches from the Throne are always considered in Parliament as the Words and the Acts of the Ministers, for which they are answerable there : Their own Safety, the Policy of not saying too much to the offending of foreign Powers, and the Necessity of saying something to Parliament of the State of publick Affairs, occasions the Speeches too often to be couched in oraculous Darkness, which cannot be understood by the uninlightened Part of the Nation, but by those Interpretations and Comments on them, the Addresses of both Houses, which is the declared Sense in which the Speeches are to be understood in *England*. You will therefore, if you have any Doubts, turn your Eyes to that unerring Explanation ; but if they are entirely silent, as in the present Case, you must observe the Conduct of the Ministers in relation to the Speech, and their explaining it by their Words and Actions. Supposing therefore, in this critical Situation of Affairs, when his Majesty thus solemnly calls upon you for your Counsel and Advice, that every one of those Lights, which seemed absolutely necessary for that Information upon which any good Advice could be grounded ; I say, suppose all such Lights should be refused, and that the only Thing left you to give

give any Advice upon should be, Whether the War should be carried on any longer against Spain? would it not convince you of every Thing you had before heard, relating to *his Majesty's being disposed to accommodate Matters with Spain, upon the Conditions that his most Christian Majesty shall judge the most reasonable and equitable?* But, if besides this, you shall observe, that the Minister takes all Opportunities of speaking against the War with Spain, either boasting what was his former Opinion of it, or magnifying the great Expence it is to us, or the Improbability of our having any Success in the *West-Indies*, or asserting that the Queen of Spain has deserted the Defence of her Dominions in *America*, so far as relates to the sending any Forces there, leaving us to be destroyed by their Walls and their Climate: Those Things, often dropp'd and repeated, without it's being necessary farther to prepare you, by acquainting you, *that if you grant 40,000 Seamen for this Year, it will be an advising his Majesty to carry on the War against Spain;* or by telling you, that it was in this Affair alone his Majesty wanted your Advice: If this should happen, you must expect soon to be called upon, to give your Advice, according to what is already engaged for you.

The Consequences of such an Advice as is expected from you, must be fatal to this Nation, and all that is dear to it. It is a cruel and hard Situation we are reduced to by the long

long Course of a profuse and expensive Administration, for supporting a Minister at home against the Sense of the People, and the Interest of the Nation, that the Support of him, and his private Favour, should, at so immense Expence to us, end in the entire Destruction of our most natural and faithful Allies, and of the Balance of Power in Europe. But what adds most to the Weight of this Oppression and Ignominy is, that it can from thence be imagined, that this Nation will submit to the being no more an independent Nation, or a free People, by submitting to any scandalous and destructive Peace. *France* may please to impose upon us. From *France* nothing honourable or advantageous to this Nation is to be expected; for this Reason, if there were none other, because, after reducing the Power of the House of *Austria*, within such Limits as *France* may think proper, this Nation is the only Power in Europe that can withstand her Arms, or give a Check to her future Ambition. To be reduced to the Necessity of accepting of such a Peace as *France* shall please to prescribe, is therefore a most melancholy and a most fatal Effect, how much soever the Safety and Favour of the Minister may depend on it, or how prevalent soever that Consideration may have been for refusing a real Enquiry into any Part of his past Conduct.



